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Really Responsive Risk–Based Regulation 
 
Julia Black and Robert Baldwin 
 
Abstract 
Regulators in a number of countries are increasingly developing ‘risk based’ strategies to manage their resources 
and their reputations as ‘risk based regulators’ have become much  lauded by regulatory reformers.  This 
widespread endorsement of risk-based regulation, together with the experience of regulatory failure, prompts us 
to consider how risk-based regulators can attune the logics of risk analyses to the complex problems and the 
dynamics of regulation in practice. We argue first, that regulators have to regulate in a way that is responsive 
to five elements: regulated firms’ behaviour, attitude and culture; regulation’s institutional environments; 
interactions of regulatory controls; regulatory performance; and change. Secondly, we argue that the challenges of 
regulation to which regulators have to respond vary across the different regulatory tasks of detection, response 
development, enforcement, assessment and modification.  Using the really responsive’ framework we highlight 
some of the strengths and limitations of using risk based regulation to manage risk and uncertainty within the 
constraints that flow from practical  and indeed from the framework of risk based regulation itself. The need 




Regulators usually find that they have more do to, and more issues to respond to, 
than time or resources allow.  Partly as a result, many governments and regulators are now 
developing risk-based regulatory strategies as frameworks for the management of their 
resources, and their reputations (Rothstein et al 2006; Black 2005).    These are collections of 
strategies that at the very least involve the targeting of enforcement resources on the basis of 
assessments of the risks that a regulated person or firm poses to the regulator’s objectives.1 
The key components of such assessments are evaluations of the risks of non-compliance and 
calculations regarding the impact that the non-compliance will have on the regulatory body’s 
ability to achieve its objectives. In its idealised form, risk-based regulation offers an evidence-
based means of targeting the use of resources and of prioritising attention to the highest risks 
in accordance with a transparent, systematic and defensible framework.  
 The UK is a jurisdiction that has fully embraced risk-based regulation, at least at the 
level of exhortation. The Hampton Review of 2005 (Hampton 2005) endorsed the risk based 
frameworks developed by the Environment Agency, Food Standards Agency, Health and 
Safety Executive and the UK Financial Services Authority and recommended that all 
regulatory agencies should adopt a risk-based approach to enforcement.  The Government 
has sought to implement that recommendation across UK regulatory affairs, and all UK 
regulators are now under a statutory duty to develop and use risk based frameworks for 
organising all aspects of their regulatory activities, including data collection, inspection, advice 
and support programmes and enforcement and sanctions (Statutory Code of Practice for  
Regulators 2007: section 4).    The UK is not alone in this move, and regulators have been 
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developing risk-based frameworks of supervision in a wide range of countries, particularly in 
the areas of environment, food safety, occupational health and safety, financial services and 
pensions regulation (Black 2008).   
 This widespread endorsement of risk-based regulation prompts us to consider how 
risk-based regulators can attune the logics of risk analyses to the complex problems and the 
dynamics of real-life regulatory scenarios. Elsewhere we have argued that such attuning 
requires regulators to be ‘really responsive’ to the ongoing challenges that confront regulators 
on a daily basis (Baldwin and Black 2008). We, accordingly, look here at the fit between ‘risk-
based’ and ‘really responsive’ regulation. By ‘really responsive’ regulation we mean a strategy 
of applying a variety of regulatory instruments in a manner that is flexible and sensitive to a 
series of key factors. These include, not merely, the behaviour, attitude and culture of the 
regulated firm or individual but also the institutional environments in which regulation takes 
place; the ways in which different control instruments interact; the performance of the 
control regime itself; and the changes that occur in regulatory priorities, challenges and 
objectives (Baldwin and Black 2008). 
A further prompting to re-examine the implementation challenges of risk-based 
regulation comes in the wake of the 2007-9 credit crisis and stems from the widespread 
perception that risk-based regulation, at least in the UK, signally failed to protect consumers 
and the public from the catastrophic failure of the banking system.2 This decline in the 
reputation of the UK’s risk-based approach to financial regulation, together with the 
experiences of other regulators who have adopted risk based approaches, presses us to 
examine whether there is a need to apply risk-based regulation in a newly reflective manner 
and to conceive of it in a more nuanced way. We will argue that a ‘really responsive’ approach 
offers a framework for re-conceiving risk-based regulation in such a fashion. 
This article contends that there are considerable difficulties to be faced in seeking to 
apply risk-based regulation really responsively but that the payoffs from doing so outweigh 
any such difficulties. One payoff, it will be seen, is that the ‘really responsive’ framework 
forces us to move away from the rather too easy vision of risk-based regulation  - as a 
mechanical/quantitative means of  solving regulatory problems, as envisaged by the 
Hampton Report, for example (Hampton Report 2005: Recommendation 1).  It thrusts us 
towards a more complex vision of risk-based regulation - as a particular entry point into, and 
means of constructing and addressing a core set of regulatory issues. It also compels us to see 
risk-based regulation not as a free-standing and discrete mode of control but as a strategy that 
is routinely and often necessarily deployed in harness with a host of other strategies for 
addressing the challenges of regulatory intervention.  
A really responsive analysis also suggests that, once regulators have established their 
objectives, they should consider how any given regulatory approach comes to grips with the 
five fundamental tasks that are involved in implementing regulation so as to further those 
objectives. The tasks are: detecting undesirable or non-compliant behaviour, responding to 
that behaviour by developing tools and strategies, enforcing those tools and strategies on the 
ground, assessing their success or failure and modifying approaches accordingly (Baldwin 
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and Black 2008, 2005). Part of our argument here is that risk-based regulation should be used 
in a way that takes on board not only the way that risk-based approaches offer a distinctive 
approach to discharging each of these tasks (with the strengths and weaknesses of that 
approach) but also the ways that risk-based and other regulatory strategies are likely to 
interact in different ways across the various tasks. 
 
 
The key elements of risk-based regulation  
 The development of risk-based frameworks follows the pattern of many 
innovations (Black 2005).  There have been a few ‘early adopters’ and over recent years the 
number of regulators adopting some kind of risk-based approach has steadily increased. The 
later adopters have been directly or indirectly helped by the early exponents. Regulators have 
communicated the detail of their frameworks and their experiences to other regulators 
through trans-national networks, such as IMPEL3 in the environmental context, or by 
bilateral interchanges (Black 2006). Models of risk-based systems are thus spread across 
regulators and modified each time. For example the risk-based model of the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) was based on that of the Canadian banking 
regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and the UK 
financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  It has in turn been adopted in 
modified form in a number of different countries, including the Netherlands (for banks and 
pensions) and Indonesia (for pensions).  The Canadian prudential supervision model also 
formed the basis for the Singaporean financial regulator’s risk-based system. The UK’s risk-
based model of financial regulation has been adopted in countries as diverse as France and 
Columbia.  Regulators often ‘mix’ models – so the Portuguese environment regulator, 
IGAOT4, used a mixture of the Irish Environmental Protection Agency’s framework, with 
that of the Dutch environmental regulator, VROM5. The Irish Environment Protection 
Agency’s framework itself drew on that of the Environment Agency for England and Wales 
and its food hygiene framework draws on that of the Food Standards Agency’s Code of 
Practice for England (Black 2008).  
 The frameworks vary considerably in their complexity. However all have a 
common starting point, which is a focus on risks not rules. Risk-based frameworks require 
regulators to begin by identifying the risks that they are seeking to manage, not the rules they 
have to enforce. Regulators are usually over-burdened by rules. They cannot enforce every 
one of these rules in every firm at every point in time. Selections have to be made. These 
selections have always been made, but risk-based frameworks both render the fact of 
selection explicit and provide a framework of analysis in which they can be made.   
 The frameworks themselves have five common core elements. First, they require a 
determination by the organisation of its objectives – of the risks ‘to what’ that it is concerned 
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with.   Secondly, they require a determination of the regulator’s own risk appetite – what type 
of risks is it prepared to tolerate and at what level. This can be an extremely challenging task 
for a regulator. In practice, a regulator’s risk tolerance is often ultimately driven by political 
considerations. All regulators face political risk, the risk that what they consider to be an 
acceptable level of risk will be higher than that tolerated by politicians, the media and the 
public, and that the uncertainties that they face will be unrecognised and / or intolerated. 
Political risk is in practice a critical element in any risk-based system, as discussed below.  
 Second, risk-based frameworks involve an assessment of the hazard or adverse 
event and the likelihood of it occurring. Terminology varies: food and environmental 
regulators tend to talk in terms of hazards and risks; financial regulators talk in terms of 
impact and probability. But in general, two broad categories of risk are identified: the inherent 
risks arising from the nature of the business’s activities and in environmental regulation, its 
location; and management and control risks, including compliance record. The methods by which 
management and control risks are combined with or offset against inherent risk scores varies 
but, broadly speaking, the regulators are concerned with the effect of management and 
controls in either exacerbating the inherent risk or mitigating it. Although the terminology of 
risk is used throughout, in practice, regulators will operate in quite differing conditions of 
uncertainty. In some scenarios there will be high numbers of incidents from which data on 
their probabilities of occurrence in different situations can be assessed but, in other 
circumstances, the regulators will be dealing with low frequency events, from which reliable 
probabilistic calculations cannot easily be drawn or with conditions of uncertainty, where the 
risk is inherently insusceptible to probabilistic assessment.   
 Risk assessments may be highly quantitative (as in environmental regulation) or 
mainly qualitative (as in food safety regulation in the UK, or financial supervision more 
generally). Quantitative assessments involve less individual judgement and in environmental 
regulation are often performed by the firm themselves (as in England and Ireland) or can be 
contracted out by the regulator to a third party (as in Portugal).  Qualitative assessments allow 
for more flexibility and judgement, but critically rely on the skill and experience of regulatory 
officials who are making the subjective judgements.   Third, regulators assign scores 
and/or ranks to firms or activities on the basis of these assessments. These scores may be 
broadly framed into three categories or traffic lights (‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’) or there may 
be a more granular scoring system, with five or more categories (the UK Financial Services 
Authority has fifteen different categories, for example).  Where numerical scores are used, 
these will often operate as shorthand for more complex underlying judgements and they may 
conceal hesitancies and qualifications in the confident exposition of the number itself. (The 
expression of subjective judgements in numerate form can also lead observers to misconstrue 
all risk based systems as purely quantitative, whereas in practice their character can vary quite 
considerably between regulators.) For the most part, assessors do not indicate whether they 
think the risk score is likely to increase or decrease over time - though one notable exception 
is the Canadian banking regulator, OSFI, which requires its supervisors to indicate the 
‘direction of travel’ of the risk, and the time period over which they think this will occur.   
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 Fourth, risk-based frameworks provide a means of linking the organisation and of 
supervisory, inspection and often enforcement resources to the risk scores assigned to 
individual firms or system-wide issues. In practice, resources do not always follow the risks in 
the way that the framework would suggest, but resource allocation remains a key rationale for 
their development.   
 Despite these common elements, no two risk-based systems are identical in their 
form and they often differ significantly in their operation - even if they happen to have 
certain similarities in form. Some of these formal and operational differences stem from the 
regulators’ often widely differing remits and their locations within the institutional structures 
of their governments. But differences also reflect strategic choices and, as such, can be 
revealing. Risk-based frameworks are not neutral, technical instruments. Each aspect of a 
risk-based framework involves a complex set of choices. They require decisions by the 
regulator regarding such matters as: the risks it will identify as requiring attention; the 
indicators and methods it will use to assess those risks; where it will prioritise its attention, 
and where it will not, and, ultimately, of political risk: what level of risk or failure the 
regulator is prepared to accept - or at least thinks it can withstand. 
 
The Elements of a Really Responsive Approach to Risk-Based Regulation 
 
The ‘really responsive’ approach, to recap, carries two main messages. The first of 
these is that, in designing, applying and developing regulatory systems, regulators should be 
attentive and responsive to five key factors: the behaviour, attitudes and cultures of regulatory 
actors; the institutional setting of the regulatory regime; the different logics of regulatory tools and 
strategies (and how these interact); the regime’s own performance over time; and finally, changes in each 
of these elements.  
These five factors are chosen because they encapsulate the central challenges that 
regulators face and which must be risen to if they are to achieve their objectives over time. 
The behaviour, attitudes and cultures of regulatory actors are considerations that require 
responsiveness because the motivational postures, conceptions of interests and cognitive 
frameworks of regulated firms (and regulators) heavily influence the regulatory relationship 
and the regulator’s capacity to influence regulate behaviour (Oliver 1991).  The institutional 
setting of the regulatory regime has to be taken into account because the position that each 
organization (regulator or regulatee) occupies with regard to other institutions can have a 
critical effect on the actual and potential operation of regulation. The actions of a regulatory 
agency, for instance, are strongly shaped by the distribution of resources, powers and 
responsibilities between that body and other organizations, including those who oversee it 
(Scott 1995; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).    
 The interactions of different regulatory tools and strategies have also to be responded 
to because they impact pivotally on regulatory performance. Most regulators use a wide 
variety of control tools and strategies but these often have divergent logics – they embody 
different regulator to regulatee relationships and assume different ways of interacting. Thus, 
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command and sanction-based instruments operate on very different understandings to 
educative or economic incentive systems of control. There may be harmony or dissonance 
between these tools and strategies – so that, for instance, applying sanctions on a deterrent 
basis may undermine a concurrent strategy of ‘educate and persuade’ by killing regulator to 
regulate communications. It is, accordingly, essential for the really responsive regulator to 
manage tool and strategy interactions (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Black 1997).  . 
Being sensitive and responsive to the regime’s performance is also of crucial 
importance to any regulator. If regulators cannot assess the performance of their regimes, 
they cannot know whether their efforts (and budgets) are having any positive effect in 
furthering their objectives. Nor can they justify their operations to the outside world. If they 
cannot modify and adapt their operations and strategies in the light of performance 
assessments, they will be saddled with poor delivery and incapable of dealing with the new 
challenges that all regulators are confronted by. 
Finally, the ‘really responsive’ approach holds that sensitivity to change lies at the 
heart of acceptable regulatory performance. In virtually all sectors, regulatory challenges are 
in a state of constant shift. Thus, for instance, new risks and risk creators emerge or are 
recognized, and uncertainties can harden into risks, for example as events occur, knowledge 
develops, technologies and markets change, institutional structures are reformed, political 
and legal obligations alter, and public expectations and preferences mutate. If regulators 
cannot adapt to change, they will apply yesterday’s controls to today’s problems and, again, 
under-performance will be inevitable. 
As for the exhaustiveness of the five key factors of the ‘really responsive’ 
approach, it can be argued that regulators who attend to the above matters will have cause to 
come to grips with all of the main challenges that are identified by the prevailing theories of 
regulatory development. Regulators are thus called on to take on board: the importance of 
divergent interests (be these public, private/economic or group); the significance of 
variations in cultures, values, ideas, communications regimes and control systems; and the 
impact of intra- and inter-institutional forces (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Morgan and Yeung 
2007). They will also be sensitive to the ways in which regulatory challenges and interactions 
vary across regulatory issues and tasks – as is the message of ‘regulatory space’ theory 
(Hancher and Moran 1989). 
 The second message of ‘really responsive regulation’ is, as noted, that regulatory 
designs, developments and operations should take on board the way that regulatory 
challenges vary across the core tasks that regulators have to carry out, both with respect to 
individual firms and in developing strategies more generally – namely: detecting undesirable 
or non-compliant behaviour, responding to that behaviour by developing tools and 
strategies, enforcing those tools and strategies on the ground, assessing their success or 
failure and modifying them accordingly.  These tasks of implementation are central to any 
regulatory strategy.  In emphasizing them, we do not  suggest that the logically prior task of 
determining objectives is straightforward or irrelevant, nor, indeed,  that in practice the task 
of identifying objectives is wholly  separable from issues of implementation: regulators like 
other decision makers can in practice define their objectives with reference to what  they 
think they can achieve rather than (or as well as) what  they would hope to achieve in an 
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ideal world of infinite resources and no institutional constraints.  Further, we recognize that 
few organizations have complete freedom of action and that, in introducing new strategies, 
the organisation’s embeddedness has to be recognised and taken on board, both by the 
organization itself and by prescribers of those strategies, be they academics or politicians.  
Here, the case for focusing on and looking ‘across tasks’ is that there is good evidence that 
the work to be done to achieve real responsiveness will vary significantly from task to task 
and that it would be a mistake to think that a strategy that works in relation to, say, the 
detection of non-compliers will prove as effective in relation to the securing of compliance 
or the assessing of performance (Baldwin and Black 2008). 
The special challenges of applying a risk-based regime in a ‘really responsive’ 
manner should now be considered. 
 
i) Responsiveness to the  behaviour, attitude and culture  of firms 
 
Regulators generally need to take on board the organisational capacity, past behaviour 
and attitude of the regulated firm if they are to achieve their mandated objectives. For risk-
based regulators, such factors will routinely be considered by making reference to risk scoring 
formulae when targeting regulatory interventions at the highest risk creators.  These formulae 
are often only loosely based around the common risk model that risk equals probability times 
impact. Impact analyses advert to the quantum of the adverse impact that the firm’s 
behaviour might have on the achievement of regulatory objectives – they will look, for 
instance, to the size of the potential environmental, food safety or financial harms that might 
be caused by the particular firm’s type of operations. They can also refer to the nature of the 
harm to be suffered: for example the Office of Fair Trading ranks the impact of home debt 
collection as high because of the nature of the harm that can be caused by abusive practices, 
rather than because of their systemic impact.  Probability calculations will look to the chances 
that the firm will cause such a harm to occur. Such calculations, are often based, inter alia, on 
the past and current behaviour of regulated firms or individuals. Thus, poor compliance 
histories and underperforming risk control systems are often reflected in high risk scores.  
   Risk-scoring accordingly appears highly compatible with the really responsive 
approach and its demanded advertence to the capacities, cultures and understandings that 
operate within regulated organisations. The quality and character of management and their 
risk controls is often a key mitigator or exacerbator of inherent risks and there is, on the face 
of it, no reason why probability calculations cannot take on board motivational postures as 
reflected in such factors as commitment to or accommodation of the regulatory agenda (i.e. 
the firm’s degree of acceptance that it has to change its behaviour to suit some wider public 
policy goal); amenability to supervision/capitulation to the regulatory authority; resistance, 
game playing and disengagement (e.g. FSA 2006; Oliver 1991).   
 Certain challenges do, however, arise when it is sought to incorporate behavioural 
and cultural matters into risk-based assessments. A first of these flows from a key difference 
between risk-based assessments and compliance-based assessments. Risk-based assessments 
are, at their heart, forward-looking. They attempt to assess the risks of the firm on a dynamic, 
on-going and future basis rather than seek to capture the state of the firm at the particular 
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point in time when the inspection or supervision visit occurs. Different types of risk-based 
systems are better equipped to do this than others.  The system used by environmental 
regulators, for example, focuses only on past compliance records, assigning scores on the 
basis of past infractions, or whether a particular management system is in place. More 
subjectively- based systems are intended to incorporate a more responsive and dynamic 
assessment. Thus, in October 2009 Hector Sants, Chief Executive of the FSA looked back at 
the credit crisis and stated: ‘The key lesson learnt is that the FSA must be proactive and not 
reactive to the management of risk. This is primarily a matter of judgement.’ (Masters 2009) 
     Such prospective subjectivity can be viewed as a strength of risk-based regulation but it 
can present difficulties. Discretionary decision-making has to be incorporated within a risk 
regime in a manner that ensures consistency across evaluators and this can present managerial 
problems for regulators. For many regulators it is hard  to strike the right balance between 
ensuring that staff apply a healthy level of sophisticated and informed qualitative judgement in 
their risk assessments and controlling those judgements for the sake of consistency. Further 
dangers are that the processes of overseeing discretionary decision-making can prove 
excessively costly in staff time and resources and that centrally-administered controls, checks 
and structuring procedures can render the agency slow to respond to changes in the 
regulatory challenges that they face. 
      The Hampton Report recommended that risk based approaches should not be used just 
for assessing the risks that firms pose to the regulators’ objectives but across all regulatory 
tasks (Hampton Report 2005).   Two central difficulties have to be faced, however,  in using 
risk scoring as an organisationally-sensitive guide to the execution of all regulatory tasks.  
First, the ‘really responsive’ approach reminds us that regulators and firms can interact quite 
differently across the various tasks of regulation and that assessments of cultures and attitudes 
may vary within firms and across tasks.  Some parts of a firm may be more amenable to 
regulatory intervention than others.  Further, even where the firm’s response is not internally 
fragmented, a firm may prove to be highly resistant and uncooperative in relation to the 
regulator’s detection work but it may be very compliant once its behaviour is placed at issue 
(e.g. it is secretive and defiant on disclosure but ‘comes quietly’ when is errant ways are 
discovered). The challenge here is to develop risk analyses that are sufficiently fine-grained to 
accommodate such variations rather than to settle for using  a crude across the board mode of 
evaluation.  
The second complication that arises is a more general difficulty in using risk 
analyses to guide all regulatory operations. It is that such analyses may prove far more helpful 
in relation to some tasks than others and it cannot be assumed that they will provide 
consistent messages with regard to different tasks. Thus, risk scoring may provide a very ready 
basis for detecting  high risk actors, but it may offer far less assistance in identifying the 
modes of intervention that are best attuned to securing compliance. A firm may, for instance, 
be given a high risk score because of the inherent risks it poses and because its management’s 
slack attitudes are reflected in a failure to manage risks well. This risk score may indicate the 
degree of urgency with which some regulatory intervention has to be made but the firm’s high 
risk score does not indicate, in itself, whether the best way to reduce the risks posed by the 
firm is to use a command and control regime applied in, say, a deterrence fashion or whether 
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an incentive-based, educative, escalating sanctions or disclosure strategy would prove more 
effective. The kind of intervention required, may at best be loosely linked to the level of risk 
that the firm presents.  
The major determinant of the optimal style of intervention is liable to be revealed 
by an analysis of the likely responsiveness of the firm to different stimuli – and this may 
involve a departure from an overly-rigid risk-based system and a drawing on other theories, 
such as ‘compliance’, ‘deterrence’, responsive regulation, problem-centred and other 
approaches to fit the context (see generally Baldwin and Cave 1999: Chapter 8).  Two firms 
with similarly high risk scores may, for instance, be respectively well-intentioned and ill-
informed or ill-intentioned and ill-informed. The former may respond well to an educative 
programme and the latter is unlikely to. The former does not need to be met with a punitive 
threat, the latter may have to be. How best to deal with these two firms is not readily 
identified by reference to a risk assessment system.  
     In practice, regulators vary in the extent to which their risk-based assessment systems are 
linked to a particular policy of intervention.  Some, such as Australia’s APRA or Canada’s 
OSFI, have a close link.  An assessment that a firm poses a high risk to the regulators’ 
objectives will mean that a particular intervention policy is adopted.  More frequently, 
however, regulators have no particular link between the assessment and the nature of 
intervention or enforcement policies to be adopted.   
Another difficulty arises if the same risk-assessments are used as guides to the 
execution of different regulatory tasks. Risk assessments may offer very ready bases for 
identifying high risk actors but they will only serve to establish the foremost priorities for the 
application of enforcement resources if risk-based regulation is used simply to attack the 
highest risks – rather than to maximise the furtherance of statutory objectives.6 This point is 
made by contrasting two hypothetical companies: Millco and Scatterco. Millco presents, let us 
say, 80 units of risk but it is cheap to regulate because its managers are well organised and 
amenable to instruction and it occupies one site. The risks it presents can be reduced to 20 
units by the application of £5000 of enforcement resource. Scatterco presents 90 units of risk 
but it is expensive to regulate because its managers are disorganised and not amenable to 
instruction and it occupies a large number of sites. The risks Scatterco presents can be 
reduced to 70 units by the application of £5000 of enforcement resource. The given resource 
of £5000 buys a risk reduction of 60 units in the case of Millco but 20 units for Scatterco. 
How should regulatory resources be applied to Millco and Scatterco? The example 
shows that simply targeting intervention at the highest risk presenter is a very inefficient way 
of reducing potential harms and that it is not possible to use risk scoring as a driver of action 
without misapplication of resource. What is arguably needed for a really responsive risk-based 
regime is a linking of the risk scoring system to an ‘amenability analysis’ that looks at the 
attitude, nature and organisation of the firm as this relates to: a) the mode of intervention 
likely to prove most efficient in furthering statutory objectives and b) the anticipated benefits 
yielded per unit of regulatory expenditure. 
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A central issue here is whether a risk-based regulator should be responsive to 
attitudinal and cultural matters by taking levels of amenability on board  when risk scoring for 
the purposes of identifying targets for intervention. There are alternative approaches. If it is 
thought advisable to separate the identification of highest risks from issues of enforceability, 
then amenability - or its absence – could be treated as a risk to the agency’s achieving its 
statutory objectives – but as a different  kind of risk to the primary risk that is subject to risk 
scoring for the purposes of targeting. Thus, ‘primary risk’ would be the risk that, say, 
Scatterco presents to the agency’s objective to protect air quality – it would be scored in the 
normal way by looking at the quantum of inherent risk and the likelihood of a harm’s 
occurring – as mitigated by the firm’s risk management regime. The secondary risk would be 
the risk that the regulated concern’s behaviour cannot be modified in a manner that renders 
the primary risk acceptable. Another approach to these challenges would be to treat 
amenability, again, as separate from ‘primary risk’ but to treat  amenability deficiencies not as 
a secondary risks but as  challenges (to modify behaviour so as to render primary risk 
acceptable) that are seen in terms other than risk – as, for example,  issues of political or 
policy judgement. 
For the purposes of this article we are agnostic on whether amenability issues should 
be seen as secondary risks or as policy challenges.7 On, however, the case for dealing with 
primary risk in a way that separates it from secondary risk (or ‘amenability challenges’) this 
can be evaluated by considering the argument for incorporating the assessment of 
secondary/amenability risk into the primary risk scoring system.  
What can be restated here is that most existing risk based scoring systems do take on 
board the quality of the firm’s risk management system – at least where corporate 
arrangements are sufficiently stable to allow evaluation. The weight that is attached to such 
managerial assessments within risk scoring does, however, vary across regulators and the 
designs of their particular risk-based systems. The England and Wales Environment Agency’s 
framework gives such assessments relatively little weight, but the Portuguese environmental 
regulator’s scheme applies a multiplier of three to the ‘management and control’ score as it 
wants to incentivise firms to improve their risk- management systems and thus lower their 
risk scores. Management and control assessments also have a significant impact in the risk 
scoring systems of many financial regulators since these can lower or raise the ‘net risk’ of the 
firm.  Whatever weighting is given to ‘management and control’ within a given regime, 
however, the general practice is to lower the risk score overall where the regulator has 
confidence in the management team’s ability to control relevant risks.   
Assessments of firms’ abilities to manage their risks are not, however, the same as 
evaluations of their amenability – their likely responsiveness to regulators’ interventions. 
Some firms, for instance, may be competent and serious risk managers but highly resistant to 
‘interference’ from regulators. Scoring systems can, nevertheless, be developed to incorporate 
such amenability assessments. The Portuguese environmental regulator, IGOAT, for example 
includes in its assessment of management and control an assessment of the firms’ interaction 
with the regulators and uses this as an indicator for the firm’s amenability to intervention 
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(Black 2008).  In the absence of such a focused assessment, however, it is dangerous to treat 
an evaluation of the firms’ ability to manage its risks, or its attitude to risk management, as an 
indicator of amenability. 
Where amenability assessments are undertaken, there is a strong argument for 
separating the assessment of amenability from risk assessment.  If amenability is included in 
the overall risk score, this will conflate the risk that the firm presents with the ease with 
which its behaviour can be influenced.  If amenability is assessed separately, regulators can 
choose whether to prioritise high or low amenability firms for intervention. That choice 
would be masked if the amenability assessment was bundled in with the primary risk score 
and an important policy dilemma would be side-stepped.  Thus, if firms with low amenability 
were given a high risk score because of their lack of amenability, this would establish an 
inverse relationship between priorities for intervention and those areas where risk reductions 
could be achieved at lowest cost.  It would  increase the intervention priority given to those 
firms that would be the most difficult and expensive to bring into compliance.  If, 
alternatively, firms with low amenability were given a low risk score because of their lack of 
amenability (de-prioritising firms who were unresponsive to influence) this could incentivise 
resistance to regulation and would reduce the intervention priority given to firms who might 
otherwise score as high risk.  Separating the amenability analysis from the overall risk score 
thus avoids a problematic conflation and brings two advantages. First, it allows opportunities 
for lower cost risk reductions to be identified and, second, it enables  regulators to make clear 
decisions on the balance that they want to set between targeting resources at the highest risks 
and focussing attention on lowest cost risk reductions and efficiency of resource use. This 
latter clarity of decision-making will be important in many contexts because the optimal 
balance between ‘highest risk’ and ‘highest risk reduction’ targeting will vary from risk to risk 
and may be affected by such matters as the regulatory objectives and the political constraints 
within which a given set of intervention activities takes place. Striking that balance may, 
moreover, involve political contention. 
Similar arguments can be made for keeping the risk scoring of ‘primary risk’ separate 
from the risks and challenges that flow from the matters to be discussed in the following 
sections – namely from the institutional environments of regimes; the interactions of 
regulatory controls; the needs to assess regulatory performance; and the difficulties of coping 
with change. The discussion of this point will not accordingly be rehearsed in those sections. 
Before concluding on the challenges of an amenability-sensitive approach to 
regulation, however, it should be noted that information on amenability will not always be 
readily available. It is not, for instance, routinely possible for a regulator to calculate the 
amount of risk reduction that an intervention strategy will in fact produce in a regulatee.  In 
the Millco and Scatterco example it was assumed that the regulator can calculate the potential 
risk reduction that will be achieved from a given regulatory effort. In practice, however, this 
will not always be the case. Such a calculation might be made if the regulatory task involves a 
well-known regulatee and a high number of similar instances of risk reduction (as might be 
the case in relation to, say, certain occupational health and safety risks) but it is unlikely to be 
possible where the risk is one that is low frequency and idiosyncratic and where contacts with 
the regulatee are infrequent. In such circumstances, where a regulator is dealing with low 
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frequency events, or indeed with uncertainty rather than risk, it will be extremely hard to 
predict the risk reducing return from the regulatory input.  
To summarise, what the ‘really responsive’ framework suggests is, first, that risk 
scoring, in relation to any task, should take attitudinal matters on board, second, that attitudes 
(and their impacts on the risk framework) may vary across regulatory tasks and, third, that 
astute regulators will be clear about the degree to which any particular regulatory task can and 
should be guided by a risk scoring system. Further messages are  that risk assessments relating 
to different regulatory tasks may be best kept separate and that risk-based regulation cannot 
stand alone. Its methods will often require supplementing by additional strategies and 
judgements since risk analyses offer little assistance in relation to many of the familiar 
problems that regulators face – such as how best to secure compliance, or whether it is best 
to regulate in a precautionary or intervention-averse manner. Even on a relatively simple 
matter such as the identification of the largest risks, risk-based regulation per se tells us only a 
limited amount about the costs of securing risk reductions or whether objectives are best 
furthered by targeting analyses at individual risk-creators or particular types of risk or 
particular industrial sectors or certain systemic risks or some other focus.    All of this is not 
to say that risk-based regulation is inevitably misguided, it is to argue that, although it is often 
conceived of as a straightforward approach, it is a complex and nuanced strategy that is often 
dealing in situations of uncertainty rather than risk, although uncertainty is often unhelpfully 
obscured by the dominant language of risk, and which has to be used with the awareness of 
its limitations that a ‘really responsive’ viewpoint offers. 
 
ii) Responsiveness to institutional environments 
A really responsive approach to risk-based regulation emphasises the degree to which 
regulatory interactions, processes or outcomes are shaped by the institutional environments 
of both regulatee and regulator. These environments are constituted by the 
organisational/regulatory, normative, cognitive and resource-distribution structures in which 
these actors are situated (Scott 1995; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). The actions and decisions 
of organisations and individuals (both regulators and regulatees) are thus structured by the 
norms regulating their conduct, by the senses of appropriateness of actions, of 
understandings of how the environment operates and by the distribution of resources 
between themselves and others with whom they interact. For regulatees, this includes the 
market and in particular its value chain.  For both regulatee and regulator, it includes other 
regulators within a decentred or polycentric regulatory regime.  A really responsive approach, 
accordingly, demands the recognition that when regulators apply risk-based approaches, they 
take into account the challenges and limitations imposed by institutional environments which 
are both internal and external to regulatory organisations and regulatees and which involve 
these actors in active as well as passive roles. Two key lessons of the financial crisis, for 
example, are that risk assessments need to move from their micro-level, firm specific analyses 
of risk in two ways.  They need to incorporate assessments of the impact of macro-economic 
factors on financial institutions (the ‘outside-in’ assessment) and, further, that they need to 
couple their micro-level, firm specific analyses of risk with an analysis of risks arising across 
the financial system as a whole.  Part of this requires regulators to incorporate assessments of 
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the impact of the financial institution itself on the rest of the financial system (‘inside-out’ 
impacts).  Evidence to date suggests that financial regulators are getting to grips with the 
former more quickly than they are the latter. 
 Focussing on regulatory organisations, the norms and cultures of these bodies are 
critical to their operations. This presents special challenges for risk-based approaches that 
seek to incorporate qualitative, and thus subjective, judgements by regulatory officials into 
their risk scoring regimes.  The formal design of the risk-based assessment system can 
structure that judgement but it cannot ensure that valid subjective judgements are made in 
practice.  As some of its longest standing practitioners emphasise, risk assessments are an art, 
not a science.   Qualitative risk assessment systems, as noted above, place significant reliance 
on the quality of regulators’ judgements - which may not be sufficient to the task – and the 
control of such judgements raises resource and responsiveness issues.  In addition, regulators, 
like others making risk assessments, are prey to cognitive biases and to over-confidence, 
which will affect their perceptions and judgement.  This can have a significant impact on the 
assessment. Some regulators have found, for example, that their supervisors are particularly 
poor at assessing the quality of management and controls.  Back-testing of assessments 
reveals that they routinely over-estimate the quality of these controls, by a factor of about 
30%, suggesting greater attention needs to be paid to how supervisors’ exercise their 
judgements in assessing risks (Black, 2008). 
The broader institutional, including political context, is also critical to the 
performance of a risk-based regime yet such regimes may experience special difficulties in 
dealing with these matters. To return to the example of the failures of the UK’s financial 
services regulatory regime in the period up to the credit crisis, it could be argued that at least 
some of these can be put down to key aspects of the institutional environment within which 
the regulators worked – notably the way that the UK Government’s ‘light touch’ regulatory 
philosophy shaped regulatory interactions and understandings about the appropriateness of 
regulatory demands; the degree to which domestic regulators placed faith in controls by other 
national regulators to control globally interconnected markets (a reliance which was itself in 
part mandated by the EEA passporting system for financial institutions which placed 
responsibility for supervision of overseas branches on home state regulators and whose 
limitations were evidenced by the impact of the collapse of the Icelandic banks on UK 
deposit holders); and the extent to which domestic regulators considered themselves 
constrained by regulatory competition  within the international institutional environment 
(HM Treasury 2009; Turner 2009; Tett 2009).  
      A further difficulty for risk-based regulators can arise when their powers are fragmented 
or shared. Thus, another factor that may have reduced the effectiveness of the UK’s financial 
services risk-based regulatory regime in the lead up to the credit crisis was the way in which 
regulatory powers were distributed  between the Treasury, Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority. This arrangement exemplifies the common position in which many risks 
and social or economic problems are controlled by networks of regulators rather than bodies 
enjoying the luxury of a regulatory monopoly – networks in which  regulation is ‘decentred’ 
rather than simple and focussed (Black 2001).  If attention is paid to institutional 
environments, the challenges of working within networks have to be taken on board. For 
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risk-based regulators these challenges may prove considerable and it may be necessary to 
cope with: divergence between the various networked regulators’ aims, objectives and 
institutional environments; variations in regulatory cultures; differences in capacities, skills 
and resources; and varying capacities to modify their operations (Bardach 1998; Sparrow 
2000; Kickert,  Klijn and Koppenjan 1997;  Sullivan and  Skelcher  2002; Chisholm 1989) . 
     If, furthermore, we look across the different tasks of regulation, we can see that 
institutional environments arguably impact on the discharging of all of these – and not 
necessarily in the same ways. This is a further challenge for risk-based regulators. To stay with 
the example of UK financial regulation prior to the credit crisis, the detection work of the 
UK financial regulators was arguably impeded by institutional understandings – for instance 
that the credit ratings agencies, the banks and the markets could be relied upon to ensure that 
the sale of collateralised debt obligations and other securitisations produced benign risk-
spreading rather than a deep-seated systemic threat to financial confidence. It has also been 
argued that the institutional environment impeded detection work because it created an 
expertise imbalance whereby the ‘rocket scientists’ in the investment banks were able to 
devise bundled products and models to assess their own financial risks (and those of the 
products they were dealing in) that the regulators were ill-equipped to evaluate in depth (Tett  
2009; US General Accounting Office 2009: 6; Haldane 2009; Gerding 2009) . 
 Response development by UK financial service regulators – the devising of new 
powers and control tools – was constrained by governmental concerns that domestic 
regulators did not reduce the UK’s regulatory competitiveness and lower the UK’s position in 
tables of good places to do business. These concerns have legal expression.  The Financial 
Services Authority’s legal mandate requires it to take into consideration ‘the international 
character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive 
position of the United Kingdom’ (Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s.2(3)(e)).  The 
UK government repeatedly lauded the UK’s ‘light touch’ approach to regulation, which was 
portrayed as a key weapon in the battle for business between New York and London.  It is 
notable that in their evidence to the Treasury Select Committee that both the chairman of the 
FSA and the Governor of the Bank of England emphasised the political and market hostility 
that they would have faced in ‘stopping the party’ and requiring banks to rein in their 
activities (Lord Turner’s evidence in response to Q 2145 HC Treasury Select Committee 25 
Feb 2009; Mervyn King’s evidence in response to Q 2354 HC Treasury Select Committee 26 
Feb 2009). 
Another institutional constraint on response development within risk-based systems 
can occur when risks spread across jurisdictions or levels of government so that new rules 
require  levels of institutional co-operation that are difficult to bring about. Thus, it is widely 
accepted by the G20 governments, including the UK Treasury,   that a key contributing cause 
of the credit crisis of 2007-9 was the failure of national regulators to respond in coordination 
with other national regulators and supra-national regulators not only to the excessive risks 
being taken by some individual firms, but to the problems of global system – wide risk and 
the aggregate effect of individual risk positions being taken by firms whose cumulative effect 
was to exponentially increase fragility of system by developing global monitoring systems and 
regulatory structures  (H M Treasury, 2009: para. 3.1; G20  2009). 
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Again with reference to UK financial regulation prior to the credit crisis, enforcement 
activities were arguably muted by a political and governmental context that was 
unsympathetic to interventions other than those consistent with light touch regulation. 
Assessments of regulatory performance were hindered by the regulators’ confidence that few 
systemic risks flowed from securitisation because the market institutions were managing these 
and modifications of regulation were held back not only because of incomplete performance 
assessments but because the regulators knew the Government to have no appetite for more 
rigorous controls  (Lord Turner’s evidence in response to Q 2145 HC Treasury Select 
Committee 25 Feb 2009).  
Some commentators may take issue with some of the above points about regulatory 
deficiencies and the credit crisis but, for the purposes of the current discussion, the above 
account serves to demonstrate the value of a really responsive approach as a means of 
revealing the special challenges that a risk-based regime faces. Noteworthy among these are, 
first, the need to recognise that regulators are often not dealing with risk, but uncertainty (see 
also Gray 2009)  Second, whether they are dealing with risk or uncertainty, there is a  frequent 
need to depart from the promise of a technical solution to regulatory issues and to  
incorporate qualitative judgements within analyses. Third, risk based regulatory frameworks 
are inevitably subject to – and, perhaps, especially vulnerable to -  moulding by their 
institutional and political environments.   
On this last point, particularly, the credit crisis revealed a critical aspect of the risk-
based regulator’s institutional environment: its political licence to operate.  Others have noted 
that firms need a ‘social licence’ to operate  (Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2004).  We 
suggest that regulators need a political licence.  They need political support if they are to act 
aggressively against firms, and not just in financial markets (although in financial markets they 
need considerable support to act against ‘bubbles’ as well). Moreover, risk-based systems 
themselves carry significant political risk for regulators. Risk-based regulation requires 
regulators to prioritise, and thus to decide to commit fewer resources to fulfilling its legal 
mandate with respect to some firms, or risks, than others.  The regulatory reality of selection 
clashes with the political, and civil, expectation of universal protection and the transparency 
of the selection process can render the regulator politically vulnerable. Transparency has a 
downside as well as an upside and that downside comes especially to the fore in two kinds of 
circumstance. First, particularly high political and reputational risk  are run when things go 
wrong in firms or areas of the market which the regulator has decided are low risk and thus 
to which it has given little attention. Second, in times of crisis risk-based regulators can find 
that they lose their autonomy to set their own levels of risk-appetite. 
 
iii) Responsiveness to the logics of control instruments 
As noted above, risk-based regulation usually operates in combination with other 
strategies. Really responsive risk-based regulation accommodates this reality by paying 
attention to the ways in which the logics of different regulatory strategies and tools can 
interact (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Black 1997). Different regulatory strategies can 
have different logics (e.g. of punishment or restoration or rehabilitation or ’professional’ or 
‘commercial’ logics). Particular logics involve distinctive relationships and modes of 
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conversing with regulated parties – a punitive message, for instance, will be framed and 
received differently from a rehabilitative message. They involve different understandings 
regarding the nature of behaviour or of an institutional environment, and in turn have 
different preconditions for effectiveness. These are based on different assumptions, value 
systems, cultures and founding ideas so that mixing logics involves distortions and failures of 
contact. 
Really responsive risk-based regulation would thus ideally  seek, first, to identify the 
regulatory logics engaged in different regulatory tasks and, second, to deal with interactions of 
logics – as these may combine and interplay in varying ways across the five core tasks of 
regulation.  Risk-based regulation also has its own logic which may be incompatible with 
other prevailing logics, as discussed below.  Thus, for the purposes of detection, regulators 
might use a risk-scoring system to identify certain firms as high priority risks and might 
deploy a number of further strategies in order to amass the information that they need to 
collect in order to produce risk assessments (Black 2008). They might, for instance, use a 
mixture of training and educational measures, co-operative discussions, advisory notes, 
economic incentives and legal commands in order to produce data.  Being ‘really responsive’ 
demands an awareness of the ways in which these different strategies both combine and 
contribute to the broader  risk-based system – of, for instance the effect that using legal 
commands plus criminal sanctions will have on the productivity of co-operative discussions. 
In devising new responses to regulatory challenges, similar attention would be paid to 
compatibilities of powers and tools.  Risk-based regulation, however, gives rise to numerous 
challenges regarding such matters. It is a strategy that requires a significant amount of 
information, but some regulators simply do not have powers to require information from 
firms (Black 2008; IOPS Report 2007). Others are restricted from adopting a risk-based 
approach by legal provisions which require them to inspect firms at legally specified 
intervals.8  Similar legal constraints can cut across regulators’ ability to enforce a risk-based 
system and assess its success or failure.  Indeed, the performance criteria which are used to 
assess regulators themselves can inhibit them from adopting risk-based systems.  It was only 
when the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE’s) sponsoring department moved away from 
using the number of inspections carried out as a key performance indicator, for example, that 
the HSE could move to a more risk-based approach.  A similar experience existed in the 
context of food safety, where European directives used to require inspections, and did not 
regard any other form of intervention as an adequate control (Black 2008). 
In carrying out these different tasks, moreover, different strategies, powers and tools 
might be used in different combinations. Thus, a regulator might employ a combination of 
deterrence and educative strategies in order to encourage a firm to reduce risks but it might 
apply a set of incentives together with a selection of disclosure rules in order to assess 
whether regulation was reducing risks. One  consequent challenge would be to analyse how 
the use of, say, a deterrence approach to compliance would impact on the firm’s attitude to 
regulation and how the risk scoring system will take account of  such an effect. Another 
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challenge would be to calculate whether an educative strategy adds or detracts from the use 
of a deterrence strategy. 
 A further set of questions concerns the degree to which using certain strategies to 
discharge some tasks will impact on the use of other strategies in relation to other tasks – for 
example the extent to which applying deterrence–based enforcement will impact on the 
detection and information collection functions that are central to the risk-based regime.   This 
can pose significant practical difficulties for risk-based regulators. Such regulators need 
considerable information from firms to sustain their oversight. They may, however, have to 
use formal enforcement actions, such as fines, to change the behaviour of many firms.  In 
such circumstances responding to non-compliance with a deterrence approach may cut across 
the ability to detect that non-compliance in the first place.  Firms know that any information 
they give to the regulator may potentially be used against them in an enforcement action and 
this can have a chilling effect on their cooperation with that regulator. A good, albeit 
anecdotal, example is the contrast in enforcement approaches of the two Australian financial 
regulators, APRA and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).  APRA 
has a model of intensive supervision for its high risk financial institutions, but this does not 
involve using formal enforcement actions.  ASIC, on the other hand, has moved to a much 
more deterrence-based approach. The consequence for their respective monitoring functions 
was noted recently by an Australian lawyer, who quipped, ‘When APRA asks for information, 
firms give it to them; when ASIC asks, they call their lawyers.’ (Note on file with author).   
Finally, risk-based regulation has its own logic - that of risks and outcomes.  Risk-
based regulation starts with identifying risks to be managed, not rules to be complied with.  
The logic of risk and outcomes can cut across the logic of compliance. In a risk-based system 
of monitoring, officials are likely to find that non-compliance with certain rules does not in 
fact have an impact on the risk or outcome they are concerned with, suggesting of course that 
the rule is otiose, or at least there is a mismatch between the rule-makers’ perception of what 
is an appropriate conduct or process, and that of the supervisor, inspector or enforcer.  On 
the other hand, an official monitoring a firm under a risk-based system may identify risks that 
she thinks the firm should address, but which are not covered by any rule that would provide 
a legal basis on which to require the firm to take action. The mismatching logics of risk and 
compliance can thus produce significant lacunae in the regulatory regime at the point of 
implementation and enforcement. 
 
iv)  Responsiveness to regime performance 
Really responsive risk-based regulators will be performance sensitive – they will be 
capable of measuring whether the enforcement tools and strategies in current use are proving 
successful in achieving desired objectives. Such regulators will also operate systems that allow 
them to justify their performance to the public and other interested parties. They will also be 
able to adjust their strategies in order to improve on the levels of performance that they have 
assessed. Many of those engaged in risk-based regulation are conscious of the need to ensure 
responsiveness to regime performance, but finding appropriate ways to assess the outcomes 
of regulation can be extremely challenging.  The issues of performance sensitivity and 
performance justification are discussed in this section and the question of performance 
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adjustment will be covered in the next section – which deals with adaptation to change more 
generally. 
 
Performance sensitivity  
Performance sensitivity will demand a programme for assessing the performance of 
the existing regime across the five core tasks of regulation. It will also require an 
understanding of those activities that detract from (or potentially detract from) the 
achievement of objectives but which are beyond the scope of the current regulatory regime or 
are ‘off the screen’ in the sense that they are going undetected.9 In order to set the basis for 
such sensitivity,  the regulator must, first, be clear regarding the objectives of the regulatory 
regime and the link between this and the risk-based system of control. For many UK 
regulators, the route to such clarity involves a translation of statutory objectives into a 
statement of ‘risks to objectives’ and the construction of a risk-scoring system on the basis of 
these risks (Black 2005).  
For risk-based regulators, however, performance sensitivity presents two particular 
difficulties. First, risk-based regulation is by its nature orientated to the future, to what may 
occur.  If a risk does not crystallise, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to show that was the 
result of the regulator’s actions.  Proving counter-factuals is notoriously difficult.   Was the 
lack of an outbreak of salmonella in the last year, for example, due to the local authority’s 
excellent monitoring, or to improvements in food processing demanded by retailers, or to 
food producers’ own efforts independently of the supply chain, or simply luck?  Performance 
assessment is not impossible, however, it is just difficult.  Where a regulator is operating in an 
environment where there are numerous incidents occurring of a similar nature, and/or where 
data is easy to collect, then performance assessment is more straightforward.  Environmental 
regulators, for example, can use data on environmental quality to assess the effect of 
regulation, though establishing causal links between particular strategies and environmental 
quality can be difficult.  In the area of health and safety, there are particular types of recurrent 
injuries at work, such as ‘slips and trips’, which occur with such regularity that together with 
data obtained through firms’ incident reporting obligations, the HSE is able not only to 
collect data on their occurrence, but to identify from that where ‘slips and trips’ are likely to 
occur, and in what circumstances in different industry sectors.  It can then correlate changes 
in their incidence with changes in its own implementation policies to derive some indication 
of performance, albeit an imperfect one (e.g. HSE 2005). 
Where regulators are regulating situations of uncertainty, rather than ‘risk’ as such, 
then, by definition, there is no comparable set of data available on past incidences from 
which probabilities can be derived or against which regulatory strategies can be correlated.  
Even in these situations, some regulators are starting to perform ‘back-testing’ assessments of 
individual firms’ risk assessments, however.  These are used to see a year later, for example, 
whether the risks that the regulator thought may emerge have emerged, or whether 
management and control systems were adequate to handle those which did emerge.  As noted 
above, the results of such back-testing can be informative, and in that example, the regulator 
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adjusted the weighting of the assessments of management and control to allow for the 
revealed bias.  
The second main difficulty that risk-based regulators have in dealing with 
performance sensitivity is that the risk-based approach, like many other forms of regulation, 
involves delegation of many regulatory functions to the firms being regulated. It is a 
regulatory method that focuses attention on the quality of a firm's internal controls – in a 
process now commonly termed “meta-regulation”- and is observable across a range of 
regulatory domains, and indeed countries (Braithwaite 2000; FSA 2000: Introduction; Parker 
2002; Coglianese and Nash 2001; Braithwaite, 2003; Walker 1969; Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000; Black 2005). The FSA, for example, is legally required to take into account the 
responsibilities of senior management in performing its regulatory functions, and, to this end, 
it has devised a complex set of requirements for senior managers and other “approved 
persons” which go well beyond the normal bounds of directors' duties both in scope and 
content, and for which the individual may be sanctioned for non-compliance (Black 2005: 
notes 185-6; Gray and Hamilton 2006).  
Reliance on, and hence assessment of, a firm's internal controls is, accordingly a 
central element of such risk-based frameworks – and is often seen as inevitable because 
regulators simply do not have the resources to do anything else. Such a layering of regulatory 
controls makes performance assessment particularly difficult though. A special problem is 
that different actors – be they corporations, regulators, credit ratings agencies or other bodies 
– may use different models or ‘codes’ to evaluate risks. This means that in so far as regulators 
enrol such actors in the regulatory regime, this involves a substituting of these codes for the 
judgements and decisions of the regulators – and it does so in a manner that renders risk 
evaluations all the more opaque to regulators as well as to the broader community. When 
layers of such codes are involved in the provision and evaluation of services – as when 
corporations, credit ratings agencies, financial institutions and regulators are involved with a 
securitised product – there can be a worrying lack of connection between the regulator and 
the risk evaluation (Gerding 2008; Gray 2009). 
 Apart from the difficulties of modelling risks and amassing information in a 
transparent and consistent manner, there are cultural divergencies that affect  regulators’ 
abilities to assess performance by relying on firms’ systems. Regulators think of objectives 
with reference to statutory purposes but firms will see internal controls as properly directed at 
ensuring that the firm achieves the objectives it sets for itself: namely profits and market 
share. The risks that the regulator is concerned with will, indeed, not always be the same as 
the risks the firms are focussed on.  Firms are ultimately concerned to ensure their own 
survival and growth, and if publicly listed, to maximise their returns to shareholders, despite 
the inroads of corporate social responsibility initiatives. The firms’ risk management systems 
may be adequate for achieving the firms’ own objectives but they may not be adequate for 
achieving the regulator's objectives. Such divergencies mean that regulators can never rely on 
the firms’ own systems either for implementation or for undistorted feedback or results.   
A good example of the potential divergence   between managerial and regulatory 
systems comes, again, from financial services. This is the UK FSA’s ‘Treating Customers 
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Fairly’ initiative. This was an intensive, principles-based monitoring system which required 
firms to demonstrate that they were ‘treating customers fairly’ at every stage of the process of 
formulating, marketing and selling retail financial products.  The FSA also required firms to 
put in place various mechanisms to assess their own performance. One of the strategies the 
firms used was a programme of customer satisfaction surveys. The FSA, however, disputed 
the use of consumer satisfaction as an appropriate performance metric for demonstrating 
compliance with the requirement that firms had sold customers products which were suitable 
to the financial objectives and risk appetite. The rationale for the suitability rule was that 
investment products are notoriously opaque and consumers have considerable difficulty 
understanding them.  (Consumers could be satisfied with the advice received, but their 
limited ability to assess that advice might mean that such satisfaction was ill-founded.)   
Firms, however, judged their performance on the likelihood that the customer would come 
back again, and could see no difference between suitability and satisfaction (FSA 2008). 
  The further complication to be noted by the really responsive regulator is that the 
degree to which, and the way in which, assessment procedures can be ‘delegated down’ to 
firm’s internal control systems will vary across the tasks of regulation. Thus, relying on the 
firm’s risk management system to assess the detection of risks may involve quite different 
challenges to those involved in relying on such systems to assess enforcement performance. 
Across the tasks there may be quite different kinds of divergence between the regulators and 
the firms with respect to such matters as the treating of evidence as relevant and how key 
concepts such as ‘compliance’ are defined. For risk-based regulators, the special difficulty lies 
in assessing the complementarity or dissonance between the firms’ evaluation systems and the 
risk frameworks that reflect the regulator’s objectives. Correlating the risk evaluation systems 
of the regulator with those of the firms may prove hugely demanding especially if variations 
across firms are to be taken on board. 
 
Performance Justification 
  As indicated above, really responsive regulators will be well-placed to justify their 
actions by making reference to assessments of performance and to undertakings on delivery. 
The difficulty that flows from espousing risk-based regulation is that this is an approach that 
makes lavish undertakings. Central to these is the promise that the challenges and 
complexities of regulation can be rationalised, systematised, ordered, managed, and 
controlled. As has been said of risk-based regulation: ’…it suggests that the notoriously 
complex task of regulating can be rendered manageable, and that the contingencies of 
unpredictable events can be made controllable.…hesitancies are lost in the confident 
exposition of risk identification, assessment and validation’ (Black 2005).  The promise of 
risk-based regulation is thus commonly seen as the delivery of a system that is not only more 
rational, cost-effective and controllable than other systems but more transparent and more 
easily deployed as a means of justifying regulatory actions and policies (Better Regulation 
Task Force 1999, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Hampton 2004;  Gershon 2004: para.2.22;  O'Donnell 
2004: para.3.80; Hood et al  1999). At the political level, risk-based regulation was welcomed 
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in the UK as a way to curb what was seen as the insatiable appetite of politicians and the 
wider public for regulation ( Black 2005). 
       Delivery on these undertakings is extremely difficult, not least because there is often 
considerable dissonance between the regulator's understanding of risk priorities and those of 
the firms, or indeed the wider public. Choosing which risks to focus on is a political, not a 
technical issue and judgements have to be made on such matters as: whether to target the 
largest risks or the places where the largest risk reductions can be effected for a given level of 
resource input; whether to focus on individual risk creators or specific types of risk; the right 
balance between acting on systemic risks and controlling individual risks; and ultimately what 
is an acceptable level of risk. A further issue of difficulty is whether to err on the side of over 
intervention (assuming that certain firms pose risks when they do not) or of under-
intervention (assuming that they do not pose risks when they do). Each position on these 
issues brings contention and problems. One danger, for instance, of focusing only on firm-
specific risks is that regulators may pay too little attention to the potentially huge cumulative 
effect of particular types of compliance failures across firms (Black 2005: notes 141-151). 
Another danger, as noted above, is that the regulators may also fail to pick up on trends of 
events that are external to the firms and which might be relevant to their  risk assessments. 
       Nor does transparency always assist in legitimation. Regulating according to a 
risk-based framework exposes the reality that there will be a limit on the resources that can be 
spent on controlling certain types of risk creators  (e.g. low impact firms), or on firms in 
certain cases (for example, medium/high impact but low risk). Such a framework also 
exposes the balance between individual and systemic risk controls. This means that officials 
are required to leave certain risks or types of risk uncontrolled or subject to limited 
supervision. This can be difficult for regulatory managers to justify to the public and to 
regulatees. After a harmful event has occurred at a firm it may, for example, be difficult to 
explain to the media that firms of that class are not regulated as a priority because they have 
risk scores that are too low. Similarly, it may be difficult, after a systemic catastrophe such as 
the credit crisis, to explain why systemic issues had not been given a higher priority.  
   Risk-based systems may also be difficult to justify to staff who have to reconcile the 
advertised technical neatness of those systems with the political messiness of the world that 
they seek to control. An irony here is that risk-based regulation was sold within some 
regulatory bodies as a defence mechanism – on the basis that  if one followed the book, one 
would be immune from criticism (Black 2005: notes 172-3).  The bureaucratic reality, 
however, has been that if senior management fail fully to articulate the extent to which they 
will “buy in” to the risk-based process so that they accept that mistakes will be made and that 
things will be left undone, this will reduce the confidence of staff in the system and lead to 
the taking of self-protective steps such as operating on the basis of factors other than risk 
analyses (such as perceptions of political risks to themselves). This is liable to hamper the 
implementation of the risk-based regime and reduce the rationality that lies at the heart of its 
justificatory claims.  
A special justificatory challenge for risk-based regulation is to satisfy expectations 
regarding openness, transparency and accountability. Here again there are paradoxical 
elements. On the one hand, risk-based regulation holds out the prospect of transparency 
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through the exposure of its numerical/analytic basis. On the other, a closer look at the 
operation of such systems reveals that they are not Richard Rogers edifices with the works on 
the outside. Not only are they are built on high levels of discretion and politically contentious 
judgements but the important policies and decisions tend to be hidden away behind the 
apparently neutral language of the risk assessment model (Black 2005). This point applies 
especially to the definitions of thresholds for intervention, the risk assessments themselves, 
and the subsequent categorisations and scoring of firms. 
  All regulators have to prioritise the use of resources but the message of a really 
responsive approach is that it is best to understand the implications of doing this through 
risk-based processes. What can be seen is that framing the regulatory task in terms of risk 
involves buying into particular conceptions of the problem at hand, leads to the framing of a 
solution in a particular way and produces special challenges of justification and legitimation. 
In adopting risk-based frameworks, regulators attempt to define the acceptable limits of their 
responsibility and hence accountability. It is also the case that matters of internal operation, 
notably the construction of the risk-scoring system, are where the real choices are being made 
about what matters to that regulatory agency and what does not: in particular about the 
selection of risks or levels of risk that the regulator is, or is not, going to take action on.10 In 
such processes risk-based regulation implicitly or explicitly defines what risks the regulator 
should be expected to prevent, and those which it should not - those it should be blamed for 
not preventing and those which it should not be blamed for not preventing. As Power has 
argued, attempting to manage risk requires a new ‘politics of uncertainty’, involving 
assessments not only of who should be responsible for dealing with its consequences but an 
appreciation that no-one is to blame for true uncertainty (Power 2005).  Risk-based regulation 
also requires a new and related politics of accountability and a quite distinct mode of 
legitimation. That politics involves new debates on who should be making decisions on the 
risks that are important and those which are not. 
  Such issues of justification and legitimation, moreover, can be expected to vary 
across the core tasks of regulation. The above discussion of risk-scoring, for instance relates 
to the task of discovery – of identifying targets for intervention. Quite different, but 
nevertheless risk-based-specific sets of issues will arise when looking at the processes of 
enforcement and compliance-seeking on the ground, or the processes of assessing 
performance by means of risk analyses, or those of modifying regulatory strategy. The need 
to come to grips with all of these issues is the important message of the really responsive 
approach. 
 
v) Responsiveness to change 
A really responsive framework suggests that regulators and regulatory systems should 
be dynamic, and capable of building on their performance sensitivity by learning from and 
improving on their past performance. It also suggests that regulators should be able to adjust 
to the changes that constantly impact on regulation –such as shifts in objectives, the advent 
of new risks and the emergence of new risk creators. These capacities to cope with change 
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should, moreover, be reflected across all of the core regulatory tasks. Responsiveness, to 
change, in addition, should involve a willingness and capacity to re-think regulatory strategies 
quite radically and to contemplate completely new forms of control mechanism if 
performance assessments indicate that these are necessary. For risk-based regulators, 
however, such responsiveness involves quite particular challenges. 
With regard to detection work, a central such challenge is the uncovering of new risks 
and risk-creators. In a risk-based regime, the inherent danger is that of ‘model myopia’ – that 
regulatory officials become committed to an historically-captured set of risk indicators and 
assessment criteria. Such commitment inhibits the regulator from responding to an 
unpredicted future. If the safest thing to do is to follow the risk framework, the way of least 
resistance is not to respond to any circumstances or events which are not anticipated by that 
framework. The irony is that risk-based frameworks are in danger of becoming 
institutionalised in a way that negates their capacity to deal with the very predictive inability 
that they are intended to meet. 
The credit crisis also showed that a further aspect of this danger of institutionalisation 
is that regulators may become committed to a risk model that is technically or intellectually 
deficient in a manner that prevents adaptation to developing threats. Thus, an error of 
regulators in the period leading up to the credit crisis was the assumption that the 
securitisation process led  to greater risk spreading between institutions and individuals, and 
across borders, and so produced safer, more risk resilient, as well as more efficient financial 
systems. The shocking reality that the risk-based regulators had to come to terms with was 
that they had failed to anticipate the way that institutional and trading interconnectivities 
within the global markets tended to lead to increasingly dangerous concentrations of risk and 
to higher, linked, vulnerabilities across the board. These developments eventually produced a 
collapse in financial confidence that the regulators could not keep at bay (HM Treasury 2009: 
para. 3.30; US Government Accountability Office 2009). 
The Hampton Review, indeed, endorsed the general strategy of risk-based regulation 
but it was well aware of the danger that risk frameworks can prove too static. Hampton 
argued that regulation ‘should always include a small element of random inspection’ in order 
to check on the validity of the risk assessment system (Hampton 2005: para 2.38; Statutory 
Code of Practice for Regulators 2007: para. 6.2). A value of random inspection, on this view, 
is that it holds out the prospect of uncovering new risks and risk-creators in a way that is 
unlikely to flow from an inspection programme that is based on analyses of previously-
identified risks.  
Random inspections may also act as a useful deterrent to non-compliance, but as 
techniques for combatting model myopia they are only consistent with a really responsive 
approach if the random inspections are performed in a way that breaks away from the normal 
risk assessment framework. Only then will they pick up risks which may be systemic, or at 
least which are not unique to that particular firm. Here again the institutional environment of 
the risk-based system becomes important. Regulatory supervisors or inspectors need to feel 
able to communicate new or emerging risks to those in the policy or risk division in the 
course of their day to day monitoring and assessment activities. At best, there should be an 
institutionalisation of a dynamic process for identifying new or emerging risks.  Some 
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financial regulators, such as Canada’s OSFI, initiated such an process during the financial 
crisis, forming an ‘emerging risks committee’ comprised of supervisors and senior 
management to systematise the identification and assessment of rapidly emerging risks, and 
analyse their impact on the banks they regulated.   
 A second need for the really responsive risk-regulator is to react to change by 
developing new rules and tools that will assist in detecting undesirable risk creation and in 
producing compliance with relevant requirements. The institutional environment may inhibit 
this, however, as the regulator may not have rule making powers, but has to rely on a 
legislature, or in the EU context, the EU law making institutions to change the legal 
requirements. Dynamism and reflexive responsiveness is hard to achieve in these situations.   
A third need is closely related and that is to ensure that enforcement and compliance-
seeking activities deal successfully with new risks and new risk-creators. On these fronts, 
however, there are problems that flow directly from adherence to risk-based regulation. One 
problem is that if the regulators see the world through the lens of a given framework for risk 
analysis (and delegates much of the application of this to firms), it is very difficult, as noted 
above, for them to come to grips with new risks and risk creators by developing new control 
responses. It may be especially difficult to move beyond the envelope of a risk framework if 
those new risks and risk creators develop in another arena or on a different scale (e.g. global 
rather that national) – as in the credit crisis of 2007-9 when national regulators were slow to 
respond to developing  problems of global system – wide risk (H M Treasury  2009). 
In the case of new rules and tools to assist in compliance-seeking, the additional 
difficulty is that a risk-based system may, as already indicated, focus more on identifying risks 
than on ways to secure compliance or reduce those risks on the ground. The devising of new, 
adaptive, rules will, accordingly have to be guided by approaches and theories – such as 
compliance, deterrence, or ‘escalating response’ strategies - that go beyond the remit of most 
risk analyses. Here, though, there is a further problem. It is no simple matter to prescribe 
that, for the purposes of compliance – seeking, risk-based systems should be combined with 
other systems. In the first instance, officials who are committed to a risk-based system (or 
whose managers are so committed) may prove unresponsive to changes (either in legal 
powers or approaches to compliance-seeking) because they are reluctant to move away from 
a ‘pure’ risk-based system. Second, where mixtures of risk-based and other approaches are 
used, these mixtures cannot be assumed to be free from tensions – a point suggested in 
discussing regulatory logics above. Where, for example a regulatory official allocates 
enforcement resources to deterrent activities in order to further compliance, this may involve 
prioritising the use of resources in a manner that departs from the prescriptions that would 
flow from the relevant risk analyses.  A similar effect is apparent when the regulator diverts 
attention to investigation activities prior to bringing enforcement actions.  The HSE, for 
example, spends about 60% of its inspection resources on investigations after accidents prior 
to bringing prosecutions.  One reason for this is that firms now are more likely to contest 
prosecutions more vigorously, as a conviction for health and safety violation prejudices their 
applications for public procurement contracts.  This is a good example of the impact of the 
broader institutional environment on the operation of a regulator’s risk based approach.  The 
risk based system, as a result, loses its purity and the risk analysis loses its power as a driver of 
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the regime - which now operates as a hybrid risk-based/deterrence/incident-reactive system. 
The same kinds of ‘corruption’ of the risk-based regime may occur where reference is made 
to other modes of compliance-seeking and would be likely to involve either or both 
resistance from those committed to the risk-based philosophy and a confusing hybridity. 
The fourth and fifth core tasks of regulation involve the assessment and modification 
of performance. Risk- based regulation might be expected to cope well with these. After all, 
the risk- based approach - at least the ‘technical’ vision of this – offers a ready means of 
judging performance. The risk scores of regulated firms and individuals can be compared year 
on year (or month on month) and this will reveal whether overall levels of risk are increasing 
or decreasing.  This can provide some value, but as noted, more sophisticated systems of 
back-testing can be more useful.  Simply comparing risk scores year on year is prey to 
‘gaming’ by officials, and even in its absence, it is limited as a method of performance 
assessment as it only tests the model within its existing parameters.   This poses a number of 
difficulties.  First, such comparisons tend to focus on a given set of historically- established 
risks and, if this is so, they will reveal little about the regulator’s success or failure in coming 
to grips with new risks and new risk creators.  Second, a given framework for risk analysis will 
presuppose that there is a perfect fit between the risk framework and the regulator’s 
objectives – and it will accordingly give no indication of the extent to which undesirable risk 
creation is escaping the regulatory net. There is liable to be no measure, for instance, of the 
prevalence of creative compliance or new types of risk creation or risk creators that are not 
covered by the current rules. As a result, analyses of relative risk scores will not indicate 
whether the regulatory regime is addressing a major portion of the challenges faced or only a 
small percentage of these.  
A third problem that risk–based systems may encounter in dealing with change is that 
such systems may make it difficult for regulators to adapt to shifts in preferences and 
objectives. Risk- based regimes always have to contend with possible disjunctures between 
the regulator’s perceptions of risk and those of the public (or certain groups of interests) but 
the additional problem to be noted here is that those disjunctures are not static. Preferences 
concerning regulation often change – as seen in the post credit crisis period in the UK when 
sections of the  public, the Government, the regulators and the media  lost a good deal of 
faith in ‘light touch’ regulation. The public may want different things of regulators at different 
times and so may governments, legislators, extra jurisdictional bodies and particular groups of 
interests. The problem is that risk frameworks tend to lock regulators into a certain mode of 
analysing risks, a certain position on identifying which risks are important and a particular 
position on the thresholds for acting to control risks. If regulators are committed to the 
framework, they may be slow to respond to changes – especially when the processes of 
constructing and developing that framework are positioned deep within the bureaucratic 
process and are, as a result, insulated from the public pressures that might be expected to 
galvanise change.  
 A further problem is that if risk- based regulation involves a misalignment between 
the institutional risks of the regulator (i.e. the risks to the regulator’s reputation and 
objectives) and risks to society (of harms such as  injuries or deaths), this may make the 
regulator unresponsive to changes in risks to society’s interests. Thus, to cite Rothstein et al’s 
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example of rail safety (Rothstein et al 2006), a rail regulator may tend to focus on risks of 
multiple fatality accidents to a degree that is not commensurate with the attention it devotes 
to the control of common minor accidents that cumulatively cause as many or more fatalities. 
It may do so because it is aware that multiple fatality accidents may detract from the 
regulator’s reputation in an especially negative and disproportionate manner. Controls of risks 
to the regulatory institution and risks to society are, for this reason, disjointed – but disjointed 
in a manner that may make the regulator less responsive to changes in risks to society (e.g. 
new kinds of minor accident) than it might be if it operated a regulatory system other than 
one that gives risks to the regulator’s reputation and objectives a central place. 
Some regulators manage these challenges by incorporating public perceptions 
explicitly into their risk-based frameworks.  For the UK Pensions Regulator, for example, a 
key criterion for assessing risk is whether a failure in a particular area would lead to a loss of 
public confidence in the regulator and in the pensions system.  Others manage it on a more 
‘fire-fighting’ basis.  As the political salience of an issue increases, the regulator’s risk 
tolerance decreases, or as one financial regulator commented during the crisis, ‘events drive 
you up the probability curve’ (Black 2008). It may be argued that such responsiveness to 
political salience is appropriate, and a good example of ‘spontaneous accountability’: the 
regulator making itself accountable to political demands.  However, if a regulator is always 
responsive to political assessments of risk, as amplified by the media and others, then risk 
based regulation loses much of its identity as a systematised and rational way for regulators to 
manage their resources. 
Finally, note should be taken of the special difficulties of contemplating radical 
changes in regulatory strategy from ‘within’ a risk-based regulatory regime. The problem here 
is that a mindset  that centres on analysing and reacting to risks will not be readily attuned to 
the consideration of ways in which risks can be ‘designed out’ of economic or social 
processes by  moving towards pre-emptive managerial strategies. Such shifts of approach may 
demand a breadth of analysis that the ‘process myopia’ of the risk-based system does not 
encourage. The message of the ‘really responsive’ approach here is that the risk-based 
regulator should always be aware of the possible need to move beyond the merely responsive. 
 
Conclusions 
  A ‘really responsive’ approach to risk regulation brings two central messages. The 
first is that it is best to regulate in a way that is responsive to: regulated firms’ behaviour, 
attitude and culture; institutional environments; interactions of controls; regulatory 
performance; and change. The second is that the challenges of regulation vary across the 
different regulatory tasks and that astute regulators will deal with the variety of those 
challenges. We have argued here that risk-based regulation has achieved broad acceptance 
within many governments and regulatory organisations but that there is a need to think in a 
more structured manner about the ways in which risk-based regulation can come to terms 
with the many hurdles to be overcome if it is to succeed on the ground. The ‘really 
responsive’ framework, we suggest, offers a basis for such structured thinking. As shown 
above, an application of the really responsive approach quickly exposes the kinds of question 
to which  risk-based regulators have to find answers  – but it also reveals that risk-based 
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regulation imposes quite distinct structures on the challenges that have to be risen to if 
regulation is to succeed. In addition, the really responsive approach forces us to shift our 
conception of risk-based regulation so that it is seen not as a free-standing and technical 
guide to regulatory intervention but as a particular way to construct the regulatory agenda and 
as a control strategy that has to be combined with other control strategies in different (and 
often contentious) ways across different contexts and regulatory tasks. 
  Being really responsive involves coming to grips with numbers of issues in a manner 
that might appear to be daunting and difficult to operationalise. Those difficulties are, 
however, vastly outweighed by the costs of regulatory failure. If there is one message to take 
from the credit crisis, it is that there is a colossal price to pay if regulators do not deal 
adequately with the challenges discussed here – notably, in the case of banking, those 
produced by changes in the nature of risks or risk creators and by the constraints that flow 




                                                               NOTES 
1. ‘Risk-based regulation’ has a range of meanings- see Black 2008. 
2. The evidence is mixed regarding the culpabilities of risk-based regulation, as banks in 
Australia and Canada, whose regulators have well-developed systems of risk-based 
regulation, fared far better than those in other Western countries, suggesting that the causes 
of regulatory failure were more complex than are accounted for by the existence of a risk-
based system of supervision.   
3. IMPEL - European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of 
Environmental Law. 
4. A Inspecção-Geral do Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Território (General Inspectorate 
for the Environment and Spatial Planning). 
5. Verantwoordelijk voor wonen, ruimte en milieu (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment). 
6. In the UK the Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators 2007: para. 6.3 states that 
regulators ‘should focus their greatest inspection effort’ on regulated entities where a 
breach would pose a serious risk to regulatory outcome and where there is a high likelihood 
of non-compliance by regulated entities.  
7. There is a danger in  compounding  quantitative risk analyses with  quantitative 
'amenability analyses' so that a kind of 'quantitative ritualism' results.  Similar scepticism 
applies to seeing amenability issues in 'risk' terms - for a discussion of the diminishing 
returns that can be achieved by seeing all issues as 'risk issues' see Rothstein et. al. (2006). 
8. For example, meat hygiene regulation; and until recently, environmental regulation: EC 
882/2004, Official Controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with food 
and feed law, animal health and animal welfare rules. 
9. Sparrow would refer to these as ‘invisible’ offences (Sparrow 2000:192, 272-3). See also 
the discussion of the FSA’s ‘watch lists’ in Black 2005: note 111. 
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10. See, for example the FSA’s Reasonable Expectations, which noted the gap between public 
expectations, and what “reasonable” expectations should be. The paper made it clear that 
“non-zero failure” meant that the regulator would not, and should not be expected to, 
prevent every “negative event”: every financial failure of a firm, every incidence of non-
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